Individual-Level Determinants of the Propensity to Shirk

Employee shirking, where workers give less than full effort on the job, has typically been investigated as a construct subject to group and organization-level influences. Neglected are individual differences that might explain why individuals in the same organization or work-group might shirk. The present study sought to address these limitations by investigating subjective well-being (a dispositional construct), job satisfaction, as well as other individual-level determinants of shirking behavior. Results identified several individual-level determinants of shirking. Implications of the results are discussed

Card Check Recognition: New House Rules for Union Organizing?

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Organizing Principles: The Significance of Card-Check Laws

The use of “card checks” as a method of union organizing has recently garnered a lot of attention, much of it surrounding the proposed Employee Free Choice Act. If passed, this legislation would amend the National Labor Relations Act by requiring employers to recognize a union when the employer is presented with evidence of majority support for union recognition via union authorization cards. Although the proposed bill has had difficulty gaining traction in the U.S. Congress, several states have recently passed similar legislation covering state and local public employees. In this article, we compare card-check organizing by public sector employees in Illinois and Ohio. In both states, card-check organizing has been allowed since 1983. However, in 2003 Illinois amended its statute to require employers to recognize unions on the basis of card checks, while no similar change occurred in Ohio. A comparative analysis of public sector organizing activity in Illinois and Ohio, before and after the Illinois law was changed, identifies the effects of changes in the law and explores the possible implications in other contexts. In a sense, the experience of these two states provides a natural experiment on the effects of public sector card-check legislation on organizing activity. Data was collected from state labor relations agencies in Illinois and Ohio to examine the overall levels and patterns of organizing activity in both states during the period under study (1999-2008), as well as specific contextual conditions associated with organizing activity in the two states. Our data show that in Ohio, where card-check recognition is voluntary, elections run by the state labor agency have been the dominant means of organizing new members. That was also the case in Illinois until 2003, when mandatory card-check legislation was enacted. Since then, the most organizing has occurred via the mandatory card-check provision. Moreover, we find the Illinois’ legislation not only facilitated union organizing, but also expanded their organizing activity into different contexts

Organizing Principles: The Significance of Card-Checks Laws

The use of “card checks” as a method of union organizing has recently garnered a lot of attention, much of it surrounding the proposed Employee Free Choice Act. If passed, this legislation would amend the National Labor Relations Act by requiring employers to recognize a union when the employer is presented with evidence of majority support for union recognition via union authorization cards. Although the proposed bill has had difficulty gaining traction in the U.S. Congress, several states have recently passed similar legislation covering state and local public employees. In this article, we compare card-check organizing by public sector employees in Illinois and Ohio. In both states, card-check organizing has been allowed since 1983

Card-Check Laws and Public-Sector Union Membership in the States

We examine the impact of state card-check legislation on public-sector union membership. Based on an empirical analysis of data from 2000 to 2009, a time during which eight states enacted card-check legislation for public employees, we find significantly higher levels of public-sector union membership for states that passed card-check legislation in years after the laws were enacted relative to states that did not pass such laws. Moreover, average public-sector union membership increased for the states that passed card-check legislation after the laws were passed relative to their precard-check law union-membership levels

Restricting Public Employees\u27 Political Activities: Good Government or Partisan Politics?

The article starts by reviewing, in Part II, the history of the regulation of political activities by public employees, and in Part III, the regulation of patronage. Part IV develops the argument that both sets of regulations, although justified on different grounds, are better understood as political control mechanisms. Part V provides some empirical evidence for this argument by examining voting patterns on federal legislation restricting public employees\u27 political activities. Part VI discusses the relationship of these laws to public sector unionization. Part VII concludes the article

Before Wisconsin and Ohio: The Quiet Success of Card-Check Organizing in the Public Sector

Card-check laws, which have been unsuccessfully pursued by private-sector unions, mandate that employers recognize the union as the representative of employees on the basis of signed authorization cards without reliance on a representation election. Card check authorization benefits unions because it short circuits the usual organizing process by eliminating the union\u27s need to further prove majority support in a secret ballot election.\u27 But by doing so, it imposes costs on employers by restricting their efforts to erode union support through aggressive campaign tactics. Our paper seeks to better understand the development of these laws and their effects, and in that way, identify lessons for future public-sector labor law and unionization

Card Check Recognition: New House Rules for Union Organizing?

A significant policy debate has been occurring regarding union organizing methods in the United States. This debate focuses on the appropriateness of granting union recognition based on majority support as demonstrated by union authorization card signatures, also known as “card checking.” Critics describe the practice as anathema to basic democratic principles and accuse unions of wanting to deal from the bottom of the deck to secure undeserved representation of employees. Proponents of card check recognition argue that reliance on National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) organizing procedures fails to protect employees\u27 rights to organize, and forces unions to compete against a stacked deck that unfairly favors employers. Indeed, the labor movement in the United States has long been dissatisfied with the legal framework under which unions operate. This frustration was illustrated by American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) President Lane Kirkland\u27s statement in the early 1980s suggesting that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) be repealed, thereby allowing unions and employers to operate within the “law of the jungle.” Perhaps owing to sustained union membership losses, unions have recently fought hard for legislation that will facilitate the organizing process

Maternity Leave Under the FMLA: An Analysis of the Litigation Experience

We begin with a brief description of trends in female labor force participation and the presence of dual-earner households in the U.S. labor market, conditions which likely led to the need for family and medical leave legislation. We then review various practices that business and government organizations have implemented to balance work and family conflicts, as well as related features of the FMLA, particularly those pertaining to childbirth and adoption. With this background in place, we introduce a framework for examining FMLA litigation. We then review cases litigated in federal court under the FMLA involving requests for family leave due to the birth or adoption of a child to determine the nature of conflicts occurring under the legislation and the resolution of those conflicts by the courts